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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bankruptcy -Factors to Consider in Choosing Between Chapter X
and Chapter XI for the Adjustment of Unsecured Debts
In SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co.,' the debtor's affiliate
company sold 5,866 automobile trailers to hundreds of purchasers
throughout the western states. The debtor then leased the trailers
from the owners and placed them with service station operators who
acted as agents for the debtor in renting the trailers to the public.
When operating expenses far exceeded the return on the rentals, the
debtor petitioned2 for an arrangement under chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act to adjust its obligations to trailer owners and other
unsecured creditors. Chapter XI permits such adjustment by the
settlement, satisfaction or extension of time of payment of the
debtor's unsecured debts "upon any terms" 3 proposed by the debtor.4
The debtor's proposed plan offered stock in a new trailer rental
corporation formed by persons interested in the debtor in exchange
for cancellation of the lease obligations and other unsecured claims.5
Some of the shares were to be given debtor's stockholders. There
1379 U.S. 594 (1965).
"If no bankruptcy proceeding is pending, a debtor may file an original
petition under this chapter with the court which would have jurisdiction
of a petition for his adjudication." Bankruptcy Act § 322, 52 Stat. 907
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1958).
'Bankruptcy Act § 356, 52 Stat. 910 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 756 (1958).
" One of the key distinctions between chapter X and chapter XI is that
the debtor proposes the plan in the latter proceeding, Bankruptcy Act § 306,
52 Stat. 906 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 706 (1958), while either the debtor,
trustee, creditor or stockholder may propose the plan in the former. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 169, 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1958).
' At the time of filing the chapter XI petition, the debtor stated its total
assets at $685,608 and total liabilities at $1,367,890. The plan proposed an
exchange of stock in Capitol Leasing Corporation, a new company, in
satisfaction of all but $55,557 of the outstanding claims. These latter were
to be paid in cash in full. The stock exchange, giving trailer owners some
866,000 shares in Capitol Leasing, would eliminate all claims of trailer
owners against the debtor, and in addition would vest title to the trailers in
Capitol Leasing Corporation. The debtor was to transfer its old rental
system to Capitol in exchange for 107,000 shares in the new corporation.
These shares in turn were to be issued to debtor's stockholders. Officers and
directors of debtor and certain trade and general creditors would receive
about 104,000 shares in satisfaction of their claims. The debtor estimated
that former trailer owners would hold 79.4% of the stock of the new cor-
poration after the exchange. Other creditors excluding shareholders would
hold 2.5%, creditor-shareholders, 6%, and shareholders of the debtor,
12.1%. Brief for Appellee, pp. 6-8.
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was evidence that relevant data concerning the stock were not made
known to the creditors in securing their acceptances of the plan0
and that corporate funds of the debtor had been misappropriated.7
It was undisputed that the company had never operated profitably,
or that widespread debts were being adjusted. The SEC inter-
vened,' seeking to dismiss the chapter XI proceeding, on the ground
that it should have been brought under chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act and therefore chapter XI was not available. Chapter X, unlike
chapter XI, permits the alteration or modification of rights of stock-
holders and of creditors generally, either secured or unsecured.9
The SEC alleged that (1) more than a mere arrangement with
unsecured creditors was in effect proposed and required, (2) public
"investor creditors"'0° required a disinterested trustee to protect their
interests, (3) rights of investor creditors could be adjusted only
in a chapter X proceeding, and (4) the creditors should receive
full compensation for their claims absent fresh contribution from
debtor's stockholders who were to retain their equity under the
plan. 1 The district court denied the SEC's motion to dismiss, and
' The S.E.C. alleges that at the time debtor was sending letters to the
trailer owners urging them to exchange their trailers for shares of
Capitol Leasing stock, the president of Capitol and the officers and
directors of the debtor were withdrawing their trailers from debtor and
were leasing them to another concern engaged in a similar business, and
were also urging their relatives to do the same. This was not disclosed
to the trailer owners, nor were trailer owners furnished information of
Capitol's financial condition or its management. Trailer owners were
not told of pending proceedings involving other stock fraud charges
against Capitol.
In re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 47, 52 (10th Cir. 1963).
'The misappropriation, totaling at least $141,000, was attributed "al-
most completely" to a deceased member of debtor's original management
group. 379 U.S. at 600.
8 The authority to intervene in a chapter XI proceeding is given the
SEC by Bankruptcy Act § 328, 66 Stat. 432 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 728
(1958).
'Bankruptcy Act § 216, 52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1958).
"0The Court and the SEC refer to this class of creditors as "investment
creditors" presumably because their interests are predicated on investment
contracts. For purposes of this note it is presumed that the rental agree-
ments between the debtor and the trailer owners were investment contracts.
The question was not adjudicated in the principal case. For a discussion of
investment contracts, see note 44 infra.
"1This argument is an application of the "fair and equitable" test re-
quiring that in any plan of corporate reorganization, unsecured creditors
are entitled to priority over stockholders to the full extent of their claims,
and that any plan is inadmissible which retains stockholders' interests
without first fairly compensating unsecured creditors. The Court in the
principal case outlines the history of the "fair and equitable" test before
concluding that a 1952 amendment, Bankruptcy Act § 366, 66 Stat. 433
1965]
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the court of appeals affirmed. 2 On certiorari to the Supreme Court,
the decision was reversed. The Court reasoned that the widespread
nature of the debts coupled with a "quite major" adjustment were
facts alone sufficient to bar a chapter XI proceeding where, as here,
there was a demonstrated need for a trustee's investigation, for
which chapter XI does not provide.' Moreover, the plan amounted
to a chapter X reorganization rather than a chapter XI arrangement.
However, contrary to the SEC's argument, the Court refused to
hold that a chapter X proceeding is mandatory in all cases involving
rights of public investor creditors.
The statutes do not enumerate,' 4 nor have the courts announced,' 5
clear distinctions determinative in every case of a proper selection
between chapter X and chapter XI for the adjustment of unsecured
debts. The essential factor is not the size of the debtor, but the
needs of the debtor to be served.' A chapter X proceeding is likely
to be required where misdeeds of management have caused the
debacle, 17 or where a need for new management is more pressing
(1952), 11 U.S.C. § 766 (1958), makes it inapplicable in a chapter XI
proceeding. 379 U.S. at 611-612.
In re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1963).
In so holding [to dismiss], we indicate no opinion as to whether or
not a Chapter X reorganization would be appropriate in this case ....
We merely hold that all issues relevant to the possible financial re-
habilitation of respondent must here be determined within the confines
of a Chapter X, rather than a Chapter XI proceeding.
379 U.S. at 620 n.20.
1" While we do not doubt that in general . . . . the two chapters were
specifically devised to afford different procedures . . . . we find in
neither chapter any definition or classification which would enable us to
say that a corporation is small or large, its security holders few or
many, or that its securities are "held by the public," so as to place the
corporation exclusively within the jurisdiction of the court under one
chapter rather than the other.
SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 447 (1940).
" The surface alignment of the six leading decisions becomes plastic
in the hands of those who, by a process of selective emphasis that disre-
gards context, find statements in the opinions and facts in the records
that seemingly can be moulded to fit either side of rival arguments in
a particular case.
It re Herold Radio & Electronics Corp., 191 F. Supp. 780, 784 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), citing General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956), SEC
v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940), It rc
Lea Fabrics, Inc., 272 F.2d 769 (3rd Cir. 1959), vacated, SEC v. Lea
Fabrics, Inc., 363 U.S. 417 (1960), SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp., 240
F.2d 511 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957), SEC v. Wilcox-
Gay Corp., 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956), and In re Transvision, Inc.,
217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955).




than readjustment of the debt.'" If the rights of interested parties
will be prejudiced in the absence of a thorough investigation under
chapter X, the chapter XI proceeding should be dismissed." A
chapter XI proceeding is improper where a plan of arrangement is
contrary to the best interests of creditors.2 0 There is no absolute
rule that debtors with widespread, publicly-held securities must get
relief under chapter X; but generally when such corporations pro-
pose to adjust widely scattered public debts, a chapter X proceeding
is appropriate to assure judicial control over the formulation of a
plan, SEC participation, and employment of a disinterested trustee
to better serve the public and private interests concerned. 2 - Even
where public debt is not being adjusted, and the plan deals only
with trade creditors, the need for a trustee's investigation of the
management or a complicated debt structure may require a chapter
X proceeding.2" In determining to leave adjustments to chapter XI,
courts have been influenced by the fact that the debtor has already
undergone a thorough investigation,23 that only the claims of trade
and commercial creditors, rather than public investors, are involved,2'
or that trade creditors have stated their unwillingness to deal with
a chapter X trustee while they will cooperate with current manage-
ment.2" Numerous other considerations may be pertinent under the
facts of a particular case.2" Underlying any choice between chapter X
and chapter XI is "the basic assumption of Chapter X . . . that the
investing public dissociated from control or active participation
" it re Transvision, Inc., 217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 952 (1955).
1 Ibid.
" In one case, the debtor's income exceeded expenses, exclusive of bond
obligations, by $35,000 annually. The plan of arrangement would have
paid one per cent a year for ten years on the bonded indebtedness of $1,200,-
000. Thus the payments would be only $12,000 annually and debtor would
retain $23,000 above all expenses. The court said, with regard to this sur-
plus: "Some explanation is surely due the creditors before they should be
obliged to accept 10 cents on the dollar for their principal and nothing at
all for their long overdue interest." Mecca Temple of Ancient Arabic
Order of Nobles of Mystic Shrine v. Darrock, 142 F.2d 869, 871 (2d Cir.
1944).
21 SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
22 General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
" SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956).
" In re Transvision, Inc., 217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 952 (1955).
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. SEC, 320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963).
28 For a discussion of some of the considerations that may be decisive,
see lit re Herold Radio & Electronics Corp., 191 F. Supp. 780, 786-87
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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in the management, needs impartial and expert administrative as-
sistance in the ascertainment of facts, in the detection of fraud,
and in the understanding of complex financial problems.""7
The decision to dismiss the chapter XI proceeding in the instant
case accords with prior case law. Misappropriation of assets and the
probable need for new management would require an independent
trustee's examination under the principles stated. That the interests
of public investors could best be protected in a chapter X proceeding
was demonstrated by their acceptance of the chapter XI plan al-
though pertinent data were withheld from them. Moreover, the
debt was publicly held-not in the hands of trade creditors. There
also was doubt that the plan was in the best interest 28 of trailer
owners since they would be surrendering a tangible asset-title to
their trailers-for an intangible interest in a corporation whose
management had already failed in a similar endeavor.
The Court's alternative statement that the plan was in fact a
"Ccomplete corporate reorganization" requiring a chapter X pro-
ceeding sheds little light on a vague area of bankruptcy law. May
the debtor's stockholders and creditors be given securities in a
new corporation as part of an arrangement? Under the statutes, a
chapter XI proceeding may modify only the rights of unsecured
creditors, upon any terms.2" A leading authority notes: "No pro-
vision of the Act permits an arrangement proposed under Chapter
XI to deal with the rights of secured creditors or with the rights of
stockholders."3 In the early district court case of In re Credit
Service, Inc.," the question was whether chapter XI permitted
claims of unsecured creditors to be satisfied by exchange for stock
in the debtor's subsidiary corporation, where the liabilities of the
debtor-parent exceeded its assets. Since there was no stockholders'
equity in the debtor to be protected, the court said, the proceeding
27 SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 448-49
n.6 (1940)., A plan proposed in chapter XI must be in the "best interests" of
creditors before it can be confirmed by the court. Bankruptcy Act § 366, 66
Stat. 433 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 766 (1958). It has been said that "best
interests" refers to a comparison between what the creditors would receive
under an arrangement, and what they would receive under liquidation of the
assets. In re Village Men's Shops, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
29 Bankruptcy Act §§ 306, 356, 52 Stat. 906, 910 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§
706, 756 (1958).
209 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, V 8.01(3), at 155 (14th ed. 1964).
2130 F. Supp. 878 (D.C. Md. 1940), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
SEC v. Credit Service, Inc., 113 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1940).
[Vol. 43
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could be under chapter XI. A year later the same court faced the
situation where assets of the debtor exceeded liabilities, and the
plan in chapter XI proposed the transfer of all debtor's assets to a
new corporation in exchange for stock in the new corporation. The
court said rights of debtor's stockholders were affected because they
still had an equity in the debtor-parent; hence, the proceeding should
be in chapter X.32 In neither of these cases, as in the principal case,
was it proposed that debtor's stockholders share in distribution of
stock of a new or subsidiary corporation. The principal case does
not note the distinction. It concludes only that the plan is a re-
organization barred from Chapter XI because creditors' interests
are being exchanged for stock in a new corporation-and this
without regard to the nature of the insolvency.3" Hence it appears
that the Court has announced the rule that any plan including a
provision for satisfaction of unsecured claims through exchange
for stock in a new corporation is barred from chapter XI. Still to
be answered by the Court is whether a chapter X proceeding is
required where the debtor proposes to satisfy unsecured claims, not
with stock in a new corporation, but in exchange for stock in a
subsidiary corporation-the situation faced by the district court in
In re Credit Service, Inc." Apparently, such a plan would require a
chapter X proceeding where the debtor's assets exceeded its liabili-
ties,85 while chapter XI would suffice where liabilities exceed assets.36
" In re May Oil Burner Corp., 38 F. Supp. 516 (D.C. Md. 1941).
" The Court gave only passing notice to participation by debtor's stock-
holders. It called the plan a reorganization because "the trailer owners
are exchanging their entire interests, including a sale of their trailers, in
exchange for stock in a new corporation, in which other creditors of
respondent, including respondent's officers and directors, as well as respon-
dent itself will have substantial interests." 379 U.S. at 615.
" 30 F. Supp. 878 (D.C. Md. 1940), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
SEC v. Credit Service, Inc., 113 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1940).
" Where the debtor corporation has assets in excess of liabilities, its
stockholders retain an equity in the corporation. To the extent that stock
in a subsidiary corporation is exchanged for claims against the parent, the
equitable interest of the parents' stockholders in the subsidiary corporation
is diminished. Hence their interest is "affected" within the meaning of
Bankruptcy Act § 107, 52 Stat. 884 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1958), so
that a proceeding in chapter XI would seem to be improper.
", Stockholders retain no equity where liabilities exceed assets. Hence
they have no interest that could be affected in a chapter XI proceeding.
An arrangement includes the modification of rights of unsecured creditors
upon any terms for any consideration, Bankruptcy Act § 356, 52 Stat. 910
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § 756 (1958), and consideration includes "stock and
certificates of beneficial interest therein." Bankruptcy Act § 306, 52 Stat.
906 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 706 (1958). It would seem to follow, therefore,
19651
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A final question is whether, as the SEC argued, 7 every ad-
justment affecting the rights of public investor creditors should
be in chapter X. Although the Court affirmed the use of chapter
X as a general rule, the argument that it applies exclusively was
rejected on the dual grounds that Congress had not so provided"8
and that the Court in General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky " had de-
cided that such adjustment could be effected within narrow limits
in a chapter XI proceeding. The reliance on Shlensky clearly seems
wrong, as that case dealt not with investor creditors but with trade
and commercial creditors.4 0 And, as the Court in the principal case
acknowledges, it was the character of the debtor, not the nature
of the debt, which controlled in the Shlensky case. 4 In the light
of the purposes of the Securities Act of 193342 it is submitted that
Congress should give statutory sanction to the SEC argument re-
quiring that chapter X be utilized whenever the rights of creditors,
whose interests are predicated on the purchase of investment con-
tracts required to be registered with the SEC,43 are involved. A
preliminary determination would be required to ascertain whether
the security involved is in fact an investment contract within the
that stock in a subsidiary corporation could be given in satisfaction of
creditors' claims in a chapter XI proceeding where the debtor was insolvent
in the bankruptcy sense.
" Brief for Appellant, p. 16.
" "The short answer is that .... Congress has drawn no such absolute
line of demarcation between Chapters X and XI." 379 U.S. at 613.09350 U.S. 462 (1956).
40 "It [the debtor] proposed an arrangement of its general unsecured
trade and commercial debts, none of which is evidenced by any publicly
held security. Petitioner has indeed no debts of any nature by way of
bonds, mortgage certificates, notes, debentures, or obligations of like char-
acter, publicly held." Id. at 463.,1379 U.S. at 614.
,2 The preamble to the act reads: "An act to provide full and fair dis-
closure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce
and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for
other purposes." 48 Stat. 74. The Court in a leading case said: "The
design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions." SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953). See generally 1 Loss,
SECURITIEs REGULATION 118-128 (2d ed. 1961).
" Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 77, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1958), requires that a registration statement of securities covered under
the act be filed with the SEC. Section 7, 48 Stat. 78, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1958),
sets forth the information required, and under § 8(b), 54 Stat. 857, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77h(b) (1958), the statement can be determined ineffective if the neces-
sary information is not provided. Section 9(a), 72 Stat. 945, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77i(a) (1958), permits judicial review of commission orders.
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purview of the statute.4 4 Such a rule would assure SEC intervention
and independent trustee's investigation for the protection of the
investing public just as these safeguards are provided today for the
protection of stockholders and secured creditors whose rights are
materially and adversely affected in an adjustment proceeding.
DOUGLAS G. EISELE
Corporations-Disposition of Corporate Assets
Where does the control by shareholders over the disposition of
corporate assets begin and the control by management end? Most
statutes give the shareholder the right of control when the sale con-
stitutes "substantially all" the corporate assets. But the confusion
engendered over the definition of "substantially all" gives no precise
answer to the question. The final determination of consent rights
is one of policy--of balancing the shareholder's interest in pro-
tecting his investment against the director's interest in having
efficient centralized management.'
" The determination of whether a particular agreement is an investment
contract is often difficult to make. The term "investment contract" has
been defined judicially in these terms:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in
a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares
in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal
interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). A district court
has said that "the elements that make up an 'investment contract' within
the statutory definition, as distinguished from some other form of security,
are not amenable to characterization in absolute terms. Consideration must
be given to all surrounding and collateral arrangements." SEC v. Los
Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange, 186 F. Supp. 830, 888 (S.D.
Calif. 1960), modified and aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1961). For il-
lustrative cases, see Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1963) ;
Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959); Penfield
Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944).
'The primary purpose of this note is to discuss the concepts behind
one of the fundamental corporate changes: the sale, lease, or exchange of
all or substantially all the corporate assets. The focal point will be on the
right of shareholders to approve such dispositions. For related works on
this subject, see Note, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 913 (1950); Note, 9 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 269 (1958); Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1288 (1958). This note will not
discuss the procedure for obtaining shareholder consent, the value of con-
sideration received, or fraudulent transfers of assets. For such discussion,
see Note, 58 COLUiM. L. REv. 251 (1958). The other fundamental changes
of consolidation and merger are not discussed. For a comparison of these
1965l
